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ALD-201 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                
No. 10-1260
                                
TERRANCE MATTHEWS,
Appellant
v.
CO MS. SUGGS; CO MR. KELLY; CO. MCKELVY,
OTHER DEFENDANTS, ETC.
                                
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-6168)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas M. Golden
                                
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 20, 2010
Before:  SLOVITER, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed:  June 2, 2010)
                                
OPINION
                                
PER CURIAM
Terrance Matthews, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District
Court’s order denying his motion to proceed in forma pauperis and administratively
     Although Matthews does not appear to have filed a copy of the civil complaint, the1
District Court docket reflects that Matthews was attempting to proceed pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2
terminating his civil action.  We will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for
further proceedings.
I.
In December 2009, Matthews submitted his in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application
to the District Court.  In his IFP application, Matthews stated that he is not employed, but
that he has monthly expenses which include back child support payments for his two
minor children, parole supervision fees, and restitution costs.  By order entered January 7,
2010, the District Court denied the motion, finding that the $1,037.38 in Matthews’
prison account was “sufficient to pay the $350 filing fee to commence [a] civil action.”  1
Matthews appealed, arguing that the District Court did not take into account his
various expenses.  In particular, he asserts that he must pay all of the fees associated with
his parole before he is released.  If he is required to pay the entire District Court filing
fee, he will have insufficient funds to cover his parole costs and will not be released.  We
granted Matthews leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see Redmond v. Gill, 352 F.3d 801,
803 (3d Cir. 2003), and we review the District Court’s ruling for abuse of discretion, see
United States v. Holiday, 436 F.2d 1079, 1079 (3d Cir. 1971).  IFP determinations
3generally are made solely on the basis of indigence, without regard to the potential merit
of a complaint.  See Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1084 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995). 
We conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in requiring Matthews to
pay the filing fee.  Although the District Court determined that Matthews had sufficient
funds in his prison account to pay the fee, it does not appear to have taken into account
Matthews’ other financial obligations, particularly his back child support payments and
costs associated with his parole.  Besides, the United States Supreme Court has held that a
plaintiff need not “be absolutely destitute to enjoy the benefit” of in forma pauperis
status.  Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948).  Based on
our review of the financial information contained in the IFP application submitted to the
District Court, Matthews appears to be eligible for IFP status.   
Accordingly, we will summarily vacate the District Court’s order, and remand the
matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
